

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BRUSSE 09197 01 OF 02 021018Z
ACTION OES-07

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 FEA-01 ACDA-07 CIAE-00
INR-07 IO-13 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 EB-08 NRC-05
DODE-00 ERDA-05 SS-15 SP-02 AF-10 ARA-10 EA-07
NEA-10 PM-05 H-01 PA-01 PRS-01 USIA-06 /142 W
-----041628 021052Z /13

R 021002Z AUG 77
FM AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1183
INFO ALL EC CAPITALS
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
ERDA WASHDC
ERDA GERMANTOWN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 09197

USEEC

VIENNA FOR USMISSION IAEA

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: EEC,IAEA, TECH
SUBJECT: EURATOM-IAEA NEGOTIATIONS

REF: VIENNA 6743

1. DISCREPANCY BETWEEN SOBER PICTURE OF IAEA-EURATOM
NEGOTIATIONS REPORTED REFTEL AND CONSIDERABLY MORE OPTI-
MISTIC READING GIVEN ME LAST WEEK BY EC COMMISSION
OFFICIALS, LEADS ME TO WONDER IF SOMEONE IN IAEA OR
EURATOM (OR BOTH) HAS NOT SERIOUSLY MISUNDERSTOOD THE
STATE OF PLAY. AS TEN YEARS OF DISCUSSION SHOW, THE
QUESTION OF IAEA-EURATOM SAFEGUARD RELATIONS IS DIFFICULT
ENOUGH WITHOUT MISUNDERSTANDING OR MISREPRESENTATION.
WHAT LEADS ME TO THESE OBSERVATIONS CAN PERHAPS BE
EXPLAINED BY THE FOLLOWING DEVELOPMENTS.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BRUSSE 09197 01 OF 02 021018Z

2. JULY 28 IN THE COURSE OF A LONG CONVERSATION LARGELY
ABOUT ENERGY ISSUES DISCUSSED BY THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
EARLIER IN WEEK, COMMISSIONER BRUNNER RAISED THE SAFE-
GUARDS ISSUE WITH ME, EXPRESSING HIS PLEASURE THAT THE
SECOND WILLIAMS-ROMETSCH MEETING (JULY 19) HAD RESULTED
IN A MEETING OF MINDS ON HOW THE OUTSTANDING ISSUES MIGHT

BE RESOLVED. HAVING IN MIND REFTTEL, I EXPRESSED SURPRISE AND REMARKED THAT US REP IN VIENNA HAD REPORTED ON THE JULY 19 MEETING IN QUITE NEGATIVE, PESSIMISTIC TERMS. BRUNNER IN TURN WAS STARTLED AND SAID HE FOUND IT HARD TO BELIEVE BECAUSE NOT ONLY HAD WILLIAMS REPORTED BACK IN POSITIVE TERMS BUT WITH THE COMMISSION'S AUTHORIZATION HAD SUBMITTED AN INFORMAL PAPER TO THE NINE GOVERNMENTS OUTLINING THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH EURATOM THOUGHT AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED. BRUNNER AND HIS STAFF EXPECTED CONSIDERABLE RESISTANCE FROM THE GERMANS AND THE BELGIANS TO THESE IDEAS AND HE WONDERED IF IT WERE WORTH PROCEEDING IF INDEED THE IDEAS WOULD PROVE TO BE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE IAEA. HE TRIED TO GET WILLIAMS TO JOIN US FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION BUT WILLIAMS WAS UNAVAILABLE UNTIL LATER IN THE DAY WHEN I SAW HIM SEPARATELY AND DISCUSSED THE SITUATION FURTHER IN GREATER DETAIL WITH HIM.

3. WILLIAMS MAINTAINS THAT HE AND ROMETSCH AGREED IN VIENNA TO TRY TO DEVELOP PRINCIPLES WHICH WOULD GUIDE THE SUBSEQUENT ELABORATION OF EACH AND EVERY FACILITY ATTACHMENT. TO DO THIS THEY AGREED TO TALK ABOUT TWO TYPES OF INSTALLATIONS: SENSITIVE INSTALLATIONS SUCH AS REPROCESSING AND ENRICHMENT PLANTS AND LESS SENSITIVE INSTALLATIONS SUCH AS LIGHT WATER REACTORS. HE AGREED WITH MY OBSERVATION THAT THERE MIGHT BE DIFFICULTIES IN FITTING SOME RESEARCH FACILITIES INTO EITHER THE SENSITIVE OR LESS SENSITIVE CATEGORY, BUT HE INSISTED THAT ONCE A DECISION WAS MADE AS TO WHERE AN INDIVIDUAL INSTALLATION FELL, THE BASIC PRINCIPLES HE THOUGHT HE HAD ESTABLISHED WITH ROMETSCH WOULD PROVIDE ADEQUATE GUIDELINES FOR COMPLETION OF THE DETAILED WORK. HE HAD INDEED PUT INFORMALLY TO COREPER'S NUCLEAR WORKING GROUP AN ILLUSTRATIVE PROPOSAL FOR A REPROCESSING PLANT AND FOR LIGHT WATER REACTORS. THEY WERE ASKED TO THINK THINGS OVER AND TO BE PREPARED TO REACH CONCLUSIONS IN EARLY SEPTEMBER. WHAT HE SOUGHT WAS A POLITICAL DECISION ON BROAD PRINCIPLES AND IF THE BELGIAN AND GERMAN GOVERNMENTS COULD BE BROUGHT ALONG, HE THOUGHT EVERYTHING ELSE WOULD FALL INTO PLACE. NOT ONLY HAD ROMETSCH AGREED TO THIS APPROACH BUT CERTAIN SPECIFIC ELEMENTS, E.G., THE IDEA OF TWO OR THREE-YEAR PROVISIONAL RULES, HAD BEEN PUT FORWARD BY THE IAEA. THEY HAD AGREED THAT IF THE NINE COULD PROCEED ALONG THE LINES THEY HAD DISCUSSED, THE BACK OF THE PROBLEM WOULD BE BROKEN PRIOR TO THE NEXT GOVERNING BOARD MEETING (SEPTEMBER 24). BOTH SIDES HAD RECOGNIZED THAT A FURTHER THREE MONTHS WOULD BE NECESSARY BUT SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO COMPLETE ALL THE DETAILS.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BRUSSE 09197 01 OF 02 021018Z

TIVE OR LESS SENSITIVE CATEGORY, BUT HE INSISTED THAT ONCE A DECISION WAS MADE AS TO WHERE AN INDIVIDUAL INSTALLATION FELL, THE BASIC PRINCIPLES HE THOUGHT HE HAD ESTABLISHED WITH ROMETSCH WOULD PROVIDE ADEQUATE GUIDELINES FOR COMPLETION OF THE DETAILED WORK. HE HAD INDEED PUT INFORMALLY TO COREPER'S NUCLEAR WORKING GROUP AN ILLUSTRATIVE PROPOSAL FOR A REPROCESSING PLANT AND FOR LIGHT WATER REACTORS. THEY WERE ASKED TO THINK THINGS OVER AND TO BE PREPARED TO REACH CONCLUSIONS IN EARLY SEPTEMBER. WHAT HE SOUGHT WAS A POLITICAL DECISION ON BROAD PRINCIPLES AND IF THE BELGIAN AND GERMAN GOVERNMENTS COULD BE BROUGHT ALONG, HE THOUGHT EVERYTHING ELSE WOULD FALL INTO PLACE. NOT ONLY HAD ROMETSCH AGREED TO THIS APPROACH BUT CERTAIN SPECIFIC ELEMENTS, E.G., THE IDEA OF TWO OR THREE-YEAR PROVISIONAL RULES, HAD BEEN PUT FORWARD BY THE IAEA. THEY HAD AGREED THAT IF THE NINE COULD PROCEED ALONG THE LINES THEY HAD DISCUSSED, THE BACK OF THE PROBLEM WOULD BE BROKEN PRIOR TO THE NEXT GOVERNING BOARD MEETING (SEPTEMBER 24). BOTH SIDES HAD RECOGNIZED THAT A FURTHER THREE MONTHS WOULD BE NECESSARY BUT SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO COMPLETE ALL THE DETAILS.

4. WILLIAMS TOLD ME THAT POLITICALLY, WHILE HE HAD TO STAY WITHIN THE TERMS OF THE VERIFICATION AGREEMENT, HE HAD ENDEAVORED CONSISTENTLY "TO STRETCH" THE INTERPRETATION OF THAT AGREEMENT IN FAVOR OF THE IAEA. FOR SENSITIVE INSTALLATIONS, THEY HAD AGREED ON JOINT INSPECTION TEAMS WHICH, HOWEVER, WOULD REPORT INDEPENDENTLY TO THEIR RESPECTIVE AUTHORITIES. THEY HAD DEVELOPED AN OUTLINE OF HOW AND ON WHAT SCALE A JOINT TEAM WOULD CONDUCT AN INSPECTION EFFORT OF THE REPROCESSING FACILITY IN KARLSRUHE. FOR LIGHT WATER REACTORS, THEY HAD AGREED THAT THE PROPORTION OF IAEA INSPECTION COMPARED TO EURATOM WOULD BE INCREASED FROM THE FOUR TO ONE RATIO ORIGINALLY ENVISAGED TO APPROXIMATELY TWO TO ONE. HE HAD AGREED
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 BRUSSE 09197 01 OF 02 021018Z

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BRUSSE 09197 02 OF 02 021023Z
ACTION OES-07

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 FEA-01 ACDA-07 CIAE-00
INR-07 IO-13 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 EB-08 NRC-05
DODE-00 ERDA-05 SS-15 SP-02 PM-05 H-01 PA-01
PRS-01 USIA-06 /105 W
-----041680 021052Z /13

R 021002Z AUG 77
FM AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1184
INFO ALL EC CAPITALS
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
ERDA WASHDC
ERDA GERMANTOWN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 BRUSSELS 09197

TO A FULL ANNUAL, RATHER THAN EVERY TWO YEAR, IAEA INVENTORY CHECK. IT WAS UNDERSTOOD THAT THESE PRINCIPLES, WHICH PROVIDE FOR SOME INDEPENDENT IAEA INSPECTION, WITH APPROPRIATE CHANGES OF DETAIL WOULD ALSO BE APPLIED TO OTHER NON-SENSITIVE INSTALLATIONS SUCH AS FUEL FABRICATION

PLANTS AND SOME RESEARCH REACTORS.

5. WHILE I HAD TO PLEAD IGNORANCE OF THE TECHNICAL POINTS . INVOLVED -- E.G. CAMERAS, MAN HOURS OF INSPECTION TIME, INVENTORY SAMPLING TECHNIQUES, ETC. -- I TOLD WILLIAMS FLATLY THAT HIS ACCOUNT OF THE PROGRESS MADE STRUCK ME AS BEING GREATLY AT VARIANCE FROM WHAT OUR PEOPLE REPORTED FROM VIENNA. I ADDED THAT AMBASSADOR STONE HAD EARLIER INDICATED TO ME THAT HE WOULD WELCOME A VISIT FROM ME TO HIS MISSION AND THAT I PROPOSED TO GO TO VIENNA FOR CONSULTATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH THE IAEA PEOPLE IN EARLY SEPTEMBER. WILLIAMS ASKED ME IF I THOUGHT HE SHOULD CONTACT ROMETSCH FURTHER AND I SAID THAT SINCE THERE APPARENTLY WAS A DANGER OF SERIOUS MISUNDERSTANDING, I THOUGHT THAT HE SHOULD BUT THAT I WOULD APPRECIATE HIS CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BRUSSE 09197 02 OF 02 021023Z

NOT INDICATING AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT.

6. LATE JULY 29 WILLIAMS TELEPHONED ME TO SAY THAT HE HAD REACHED ROMETSCH AND REPORTED TO HIM THAT HE HAD SUBMITTED THE IDEAS THEY HAD DISCUSSED TO THE NINE GOVERNMENTS AND THAT HE HOPED THAT AT COREPER DISCUSSIONS SCHEDULED FOR SEPTEMBER 7 HE COULD GET A GREEN LIGHT FOR THE PROPOSALS. ROMETSCH HAD TOLD HIM THAT THE EURATOM-IAEA EXPERTS MEETING LAST WEEK ON FABRICATION PLANTS HAD ENCOUNTERED NEW DIFFICULTIES BUT THAT PARADOXICALLY THEIR JOINT EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THESE PROBLEMS HAD BROUGHT AN IMPROVEMENT IN WORKING RELATIONS. WILLIAMS THEN SAID THAT HE HAD HEARD THAT ROMETSCH WAS NOT SATISFIED WITH THEIR EARLIER DISCUSSIONS AND UNDERSTANDINGS. WILLIAMS QUOTES ROMETSCH AS SAYING IN REPLY THAT HE WAS "GREATLY SURPRISED" THAT SUCH AN UNFOUNDED INDICATION COULD HAVE REACHED WILLIAMS.

7. WHAT IS GOING ON?

8. IN CONSIDERING SITUATION WE SHOULD BEAR IN MIND THAT COMMISSIONER BRUNNER SEVERAL MONTHS AGO REALIZED THAT HIS HOPE FOR A PRAGMATIC POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE IAEA-EURATOM SAFEGUARDS PROBLEM WAS BEING COMPROMISED BY THE HARDLINE ATTITUDES OF TRADITIONAL BUREAUCRATS IN THE COMMUNITY. IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT HE PERSUADED LEONARD WILLIAMS, DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR ENERGY, TO TAKE OVER THE NEGOTIATIONS. WILLIAMS IS A VETERAN BRITISH CIVIL SERVANT WHO IS QUITE CYNICAL ABOUT THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION -- WILLIAMS WOULD SAY HE IS REALISTIC -- AND THEREFORE BY NATURE PREPARED TO GO FURTHER IN TALKS WITH THE IAEA THAN WAS HIS PREDECESSOR, FERNAND SPAAK, OR HIS OWN STAFF. INDEED HE RECOGNIZES THAT

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BRUSSE 09197 02 OF 02 021023Z

HIS EFFORTS MAY BE FRUSTRATED EITHER BY THE MEMBER STATES
OR BY ZEALOTS. HE HOPES TO CONTROL EURATOM ZEALOTS. I
HOPE SOMEONE IS TRYING TO CONTROL IAEA ZEALOTS. HINTON

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: AGREEMENTS, NEGOTIATIONS, NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS, NUCLEAR REACTORS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 02-Aug-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977BRUSSE09197
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D770276-0333
Format: TEL
From: BRUSSELS USEEC
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t197708108/aaaadnpr.tel
Line Count: 233
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 83f19e4f-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION OES
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 77 VIENNA 6743
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 17-Nov-2004 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 1424082
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: EURATOM-IAEA NEGOTIATIONS
TAGS: TECH, EEC, IAEA, EURATOM
To: STATE USIAEA
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/83f19e4f-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009